# On the normative importance of economic growth Bachelor thesis at the Chair IV: Political Philosophy Supervisor: Dr Matthias Brinkmann Grade Thesis: 1,0 (best possible) Grade Disputation: 1,0 (best possible) # 1.            Introduction If economic growth is discussed at all in practical philosophy, it is usually from a position of scepticism or rejection of its possible normative value. John Rawls, for example, whose _A Theory of Justice_ is the most frequently cited work in the _Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_ (see Schwitzgebel 2020), and who is considered one of the most influential political philosophers, pays little attention to economic growth in his theories. There are only a few sentences on the subject in his entire work, and they can be summarised by the fact that he subscribes to the growth scepticism popularised by John Mill as early as 1848. According to Rawls, a just society would not need economic growth and the idea that _"economic growth [is] to go on indefinitely, upwards and onwards"_ should be rejected (cf. Rawls 2000, p. 107). In recent years, particularly in light of the climate crisis, this scepticism towards economic growth has become even more popular in academic discourse (see Rose 2020, p.2). This sentiment of widespread disinterest in the nature of growth and the associated negation of a possible normative value has been a prevalent but rarely explicitly discussed paradigm of the _stationary state_ in political philosophy and political economy for two centuries. The aim of this paper is to show that this paradigm is wrong and that economic growth should be given greater attention in normative considerations than has been the case in practical philosophy to date. Furthermore, the aim is to work out how economic growth is essential to achieve and maintain certain normatively desirable states. In other words, it will be shown that, from a consequentialist perspective, the existence of growth in a society is generally something desirable for normative reasons. To this end, Section 2 begins by analysing what economic growth actually is and what processes it is made up of, based on current theories from the economic sciences. Section 3 elaborates on the _stationary state_ paradigm, which is influential in political philosophy. Section 4 deals briefly with the topic of the limits to growth. Section 5 then develops the arguments in favour of the normative value of growth. Section 6 is devoted to a discussion of possible limitations and implications of the conclusions drawn from these arguments. # 2.           What growth is Growth is an empirical phenomenon. It is therefore necessary to clarify what growth actually is before engaging in a normative discussion. Many popular prejudices and misconceptions about growth, which also underlie the _stationary state paradigm, have their_ origins in outdated theories about what growth is and how it works. Neoclassical growth theories in particular, which dominated macroeconomics until the 1980s and continue to shape philosophical thinking to this day, have a predisposition to converge to static states in their forecasts. One of the reasons for this is that they are unable to adequately integrate changes in parameters, e.g. those brought about by innovation (cf. Muzhani 2014, p.476). In response to the empirical and theoretical deficits of the neoclassical model, so-called endogenous growth theories emerged from the 1980s onwards, which are now the dominant growth theories in economics. Endogenous growth theories conceptualise growth as a process within an economic system that is primarily based on the accumulation of research and knowledge at the level of industries and companies (see Muzhani 2014, p.325). In contrast to the neoclassical model - which identifies the accumulation of capital with decreasing marginal productivity as the main driver of growth - these models do not generally converge towards static states (cf. Muzhani 2014, p. 326). In order to better explain phenomena such as the empirically established decoupling of growth from emissions in industrialised nations (cf. Ritchie 2021), the so-called second generation of endogenous growth theories has established itself in the mainstream of growth research since the 1990s (cf. Muzhani 2014, p. 463). This includes neo-Schumpeterian theories that integrate the concept of creative destruction by economist Joseph Schumpeter into endogenous growth theory (cf. Muzhani 2014, p. 463). These current neo-Schumpeterian growth theories, particularly in their elaboration by Philipe Aghion, serve as a paradigmatic basis for understanding growth in this paper. Based on this, a general introduction to growth theory is first provided below so that it can be referred to for premises in the subsequent sections. ## 2.1 Growth as an increase in GDP Broadly speaking, economic growth is defined as a general increase in economic activity that is accompanied by a sustained increase in the value of goods and services produced and consumed (cf. Muzhani 2014, p.3). Whenever growth is discussed in economics, political debates or in the daily news, these discussions mainly centre on one measure and its change: gross domestic product (GDP). GDP is used in particular by political institutions and in the financial world to gain an impression of developments in the economy as a whole. It is therefore calculated regularly by most countries - in Germany, for example, every three months by the Federal Statistical Office (see Mankiw 2021, p.670). GDP is usually defined as "the market value of all goods and services intended for final consumption that are produced in a country in a given period of time" (cf. Mankiw 2021, p.667). It is usually calculated by adding consumption, investment, net exports and government spending less transfers (cf. Mankiw 2021, p.672). In order to capture actual economic growth more accurately, real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) GDP per capita is calculated from this in order to measure real economic growth unaffected by demographic or monetary distortions. Global real GDP per capita is a useful tool for empirically and quantitatively analysing the economic growth of mankind. As a rule, growth is simply defined as an increase in real GDP or real GDP per capita. This thesis follows this definition of growth in empirical discussions - but not without restrictions, as GDP as an aggregated value is merely an approximation. Focussing solely on GDP is therefore insufficient for a detailed normative discussion or political objective. The aim of this thesis is ultimately to analyse and elaborate on the normative value of economic growth in general. Ergo, in the end it should be shown that the existence of economic growth in a society is in principle something desirable - similar to how the existence of the rule of law or democracy is often regarded as something desirable in a society in principle. However, the existence of growth - similar to the existence of democracy or the rule of law - is a complex state. This occurs in various forms, which is why the mere determination of the existence of growth is insufficient for a normative judgement, as the concrete form is also important. For this reason, this thesis will also have to resort to more differentiated analyses later in discussion section 6, which go beyond a mere consideration of GDP. One reason for this is that GDP does not capture the quality of growth. It is therefore unable to differentiate the way in which growth has come about or how it is distributed in society - for example, an increase in GDP due to the excessive use of natural resources, increases in working hours or war production must be assessed differently in qualitative and normative terms than growth due to the expansion of renewable energies. Similarly, GDP per capita as an average value of an aggregate does not allow any statements to be made about how economic productivity and its output are distributed in society, nor does it capture unpaid labour - although these aspects in particular can be essential for normative discussions. Furthermore, GDP or its change does not represent the complete phenomenon of growth per se, but merely the quantitatively measurable increase in the value of overall economic output that goes hand in hand with growth. In order to understand the significance of growth in principle for society as a whole - and thus also for theorising in political philosophy - it is therefore not enough to understand growth merely as an increase in a number, nor as a mere increase in the quantity of economic value produced. This simple idea that growth simply means an increase in services and goods is as misleading as it is unfortunately popular, and probably one of the reasons why relatively little attention is paid to growth in philosophy and why endless growth is often regarded as absurd. To understand growth and its normative meaning, it must be understood as a multi-part process of overall societal transformation - which, while ultimately leading to the measured increase in productivity and thus the value of economic output, encompasses much more than that. ## 2.2 The inputs of growth[**[1]**](#_ftn1) Economic growth as output measured by GDP is equivalent to an increase in economic productive power, which in turn results from several inputs that thus act as the variables of growth. Since neoclassical theory, these inputs have been described by the production function (see Mankiw 2021, p.710): _Economic Output:_  The variables correspond in this function (cf. Mankiw 2021, p.710):       An increase in economic output takes place on an abstracted level by increasing these factors, with the available production technology A acting as a multiplier. This has the effect that continuous economic growth is also partly accompanied by a decrease in factors, as it replaces their intensity. It can be observed that, particularly in industrialised nations, the continuous improvement of production technologies _A_ and the steady accumulation of real capital _K, as_ well as an increase in human capital _H_ through improved education, leads to a decrease in the amount of work performed _L_ and, in some cases, the amount of natural resources _N as_ well. For example, the average working week in Germany in the 1860s was around 78 hours (see Meinert 2013), whereas today it is less than half that at 34.7 hours (Federal Statistical Office 2022). At the same time, GDP per capita in Germany rose from around $2,600 to around $47,000 (Maddison Project Database 2020) . Another relevant factor for economic output, which is not itself a direct input, is the aspect of market value, as the size of economic output is measured by its market value. Ergo, a product - possibly of higher quality - with a correspondingly higher market value contributes more to growth than several cheaper products of the same category. An economy that begins to produce and consume products of higher quality, for example because they are more sustainable or more robust, has a higher economic output than a society that produces and consumes the same quantity of products with a lower value. For example, the People's Republic of China is now quantitatively the largest exporter of automobiles in the world - but is only in 12th place in a global comparison of countries in terms of sales and thus the economic value of its automotive exports, as these largely consist of low-cost vehicle models for developing countries (cf. Schasfoort 2023). Furthermore, productivity increases in the manufacturing sector due to competitive pressure also lead to an increase in the monetary value of labour in the service sector, meaning that it contributes more to economic output even without an increase in efficiency (cf. Aghion et al. 2023, p.160). ## 2.3 The neo-Schumpeterian paradigm of growth The way in which the individual components of production interact to shape the process of economic growth is essential in order to understand economic growth as a transformation of society as a whole with strong normative implications. The great extension of endogenous growth theories compared to the neoclassical model is that they do not understand technology and knowledge in the form of human capital as external, unexplained factors, but rather endogenise these factors: The diffusion of technology and knowledge is something that arises from within the economic system itself. It is the pursuit of economic expansion in the form of profit and growth that incentivises individual actors to invest in research, development and education. The resulting growth in turn gives people even more opportunities to research, learn and develop. Growth and the accumulation of knowledge are mutually reinforcing. This interaction in a social and institutional context constitutes the three core ideas of the neo-Schumpeterian paradigm developed by Philippe Aghion: **1. _innovation and diffusion of knowledge are the main drivers of economic growth._** Long-term economic growth is the result of accumulating innovations that build on each other and are made possible by knowledge being codified and disseminated in a society (cf. Aghion 2023, p.4). One of the main reasons for the exponential economic growth of the last two centuries is the general accessibility of knowledge that has been established since the Enlightenment. Until the early modern period, institutions such as guilds kept technical knowledge secret and access to theoretical knowledge was mainly reserved for small circles of the clergy and nobility. The abolition of such barriers in the course of the Enlightenment from the end of the 18th century made it possible for more and more people to build up their human capital and develop innovations based on the knowledge of others. Instead of researching fundamentals anew each time, entrepreneurs and scientists can build on the knowledge of their predecessors, allowing innovations to accumulate exponentially (cf. Aghion 2023, p.34). **2. _innovation depends on incentives_** and is therefore a social process that is made possible by institutional framework conditions (cf. ibid. p.4). These include, above all, property rights, e.g. in the form of patents, which create incentives for inventions and promote their dissemination (cf. ibid. p.36) - but also inclusive political institutions and educational facilities, which promote freedom of research and social mobility and enable individuals to participate in education, research and development in the first place (cf. ibid. p.206). Democracies, through their inclusive institutions, therefore also empirically offer the best conditions for innovation and growth (cf. ibid. 292). **3. _creative destruction_.** Creative destruction is the process in which new innovations make existing technologies obsolete; new companies, new industries and new business models push existing ones out of the market, and existing jobs are destroyed and replaced by new activities and jobs. Creative destruction is the driving force of capitalism, ensuring its constant reproduction and renewal, and generating growth in the process (cf. ibid. p. 1). However, it also generates conflicts at the heart of the growth process - both between the existing companies, which try to defend their position against competition from the new (cf. ibid. p.5), and social conflicts, as creative destruction always goes hand in hand with the release of labour and capital, i.e. also with the destruction of jobs, which are not always completely replaced by new ones for those affected (cf. ibid. p.15). # 3.             The stationary state paradigm Over the past two centuries, humanity has experienced unprecedented, exponential economic growth. Global GDP per capita rose from $1,102 to $15,212 between 1800 and 2018 (Maddison Project Database 2020). The positive effects of the prosperity achieved through this growth - such as the increase in life expectancy, the reduction in poverty and infant mortality - are rarely questioned. However, the potential and value of growth itself has often been and continues to be strongly questioned. Economists and philosophers often advocate, usually implicitly, an attitude that can be described as a _stationary state paradigm_. This paradigm can be broken down into two statements: 1) Further or even infinite growth is impossible. 2) Further or even infinite growth is normatively undesirable. Instead of growth, the normative goal should be to achieve a _stationary state_, i.e. a stagnating economy that maintains a certain level of prosperity but in which there is no economic growth. _The steady state_ paradigm, which was developed and advocated by the economist Herman Daly, is to be distinguished from the _stationary state_ paradigm. This is primarily based on the influential ecological critique of growth and associated concepts such as degrowth. Daly's _steady state_ paradigm can be seen as one of the more influential variations of the _stationary state_ paradigm, as it refers to the same canonical origins in Malthus and Mill and represents the same core ideas, although it expands these to include several ecological and thermodynamic premises and argues more strongly from a neo-Malthusian and anti-anthropocentric perspective (cf. Daly 2012, p. 14 - 24). This thesis focuses on the much broader and in political philosophy more prevalent _stationary state paradigm_ and on the associated questions about the meaning of growth, particularly in the context of society and institutions, i.e. from a classic anthropocentric perspective. Ecological arguments, even though they play a significant role in the discourse on the normative value of growth today, will only be discussed in passing - firstly because they are not so central to the paradigm discussed here, and secondly because a detailed examination of the ecological critique of growth can already be found in my work _Klimakrise, Degrowth und die Grenzen des Wachstums: Warum wir mehr und nicht weniger Wachstum brauchen_ (see: Skrobisz 2022). In the following, the _stationary state_ paradigm will be analysed in terms of its origins, premises and prevalence, particularly in political philosophy, before the arguments against this paradigm are presented in the following sections. The focus here is primarily on the second statement, as this, in contrast to the first, is not only descriptive but also normative in nature and is significantly more influential in the discourse. ## 3.1 The origins of the first idea The idea that a perfect society would be an economically unchanging, i.e. stagnant or static one, can already be found in its basic outlines in the beginnings of political philosophy. The concept of the perfect state, which is presented by Plato in "The State", recognises no change through disruptive technologies or economic growth. Moreover, the philosopher-king is supposed to align it with the realisation of the good, which is an eternal being and thus "not subject to change through becoming and passing away" (cf. Plato 485b). The only possible change that Plato concedes to the perfect state - and with which he somewhat anticipates the scepticism of progress of the _stationary state paradigm_ - is decay, since "everything that comes into being also perishes" (cf. Plato 546a). The paradigm as such began with the start of political economy, namely with Adam Smith. In his [_An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations_](https://www.britannica.com/topic/the-Wealth-of-Nations), published in 1776, he articulated the first premise of the impossibility of endless growth. Smith postulates that a country will inevitably reach a _stationary state_ if it generates all the wealth available to it through its climate, resources and trade relations, which would result in the marginal utility and thus the return on invested capital approaching zero (see Smith 2007, p. 78). He also speculates that the Netherlands of his time, or the _province of Holland, was_ approaching this state (cf. Smith 2007, p. 79). However, Smith does not see the achievement of this state as something normatively desirable, as "while the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, [...] the condition [...] of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state to all the different orders of the society. The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy" (Smith 2007, p.68). Smith reasoned that when returns in the form of profits fall in an economy, workers' wages also fall due to the increasing competitive pressure between companies. As a result, the general population in the steady state becomes impoverished in the long term. This idea that diminishing marginal utility of invested capital would lead to the end of economic growth and consequently to the precarisation of the working class was very influential in economics until the beginning of the 20th century. It also had a lasting influence on political philosophy. It served as the basis for John Stuart Mill's utilitarian reflections on political economy and ultimately his normative considerations on the _stationary state_ (see Mill 2009, p. 598). In a slightly modified form, as the Marxian _law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall,_ it is also one of the central premises of Marxism (cf. Marx 2004, p. 209). Alongside Smith, Thomas Malthus in particular was instrumental in popularising the first idea of the _stationary state_ paradigm. In his essay _On the Principle of Population,_ published in 1798, Malthus argued that the output of an economy essentially results from the combination of labour and land, whereby each additional worker only contributes a decreasing marginal utility to the increase in productivity (cf. Malthus 1998, p.6). In Malthus' model, the limited availability of arable land leads to a cycle in which population growth is always followed by falling per capita productivity until the population is decimated back to a subsistence level by crises such as famine. In Malthus' model, the only way to achieve relative growth per capita is therefore to reduce the population, but there are hard limits to absolute growth (see Aghion 2023, p.30). Malthus' theories did not hold up empirically. He did not consider that each additional person is not just a uniform labour force and a sink for resources. He overlooked the possibilities of technological progress and that more people are also potentially more sources of intelligence and knowledge, which contribute to accumulating innovations, which in turn enable the decoupling of calories produced from available land. For example, in the last sixty years alone, the global average yield of wheat per hectare of arable land has tripled from around one tonne to over three tonnes (cf. Ritchie et al. 2022). In the 1960s and 1970s neo-Malthusian theories, which predicted cataclysmic famines and wars if the world population continued to grow, once again gained great academic and political influence. As a result, millions of people were sterilised by their governments world wide, often under duress, particularly in developing countries - the global population has nevertheless doubled since then and famines have become rarer (see Mann 2018). Although the predictions of neo-Malthusian thinkers, such as Paul Ehrlich or Herman Daly, could not hold up empirically any more than those of Malthus, their argumentation patterns are still widely used today and often implicitly form the basis for _stationary state_ arguments. This is probably due to two phenomena in particular: 1) People generally have great difficulty understanding exponential growth mathematically and intuitively predicting its development - a phenomenon known in psychology as the _exponential growth bias_. It is very pronounced even among educated people who are aware of this bias (cf. Schonger & Sele 2021). Exponential increases through accumulative processes, whether through compound interest, technological developments, knowledge diffusion, population growth, etc., are difficult for us humans to comprehend - but they are what drive economic growth.  2) Throughout its history, mankind has repeatedly experienced phases of extensive technological and economic stagnation. These phases were actually characterised by oscillations between population growth and decimating crises, as described by Thomas Malthus - several such phases have now been empirically documented for the period between 1200 and 1800 (cf. McAfee 2020, p.11). Due to slow technological progress and the slow spread of knowledge in feudal societies, global GDP per capita grew at a negligible rate of 0.05% per year between 1000 and 1820 (cf. Aghion 2023, p.21) until a phase of relatively constant, significant global growth occurred from 1820 onwards, in which we still find ourselves. In general, global GDP per capita has grown cumulatively by around 1,300% over the last two hundred years (Maddison Project Database 2020). Living in a noticeably economically growing world is therefore a relatively new phenomenon for humanity. It can therefore be assumed that the experience of existing in a largely growthless world, which has dominated the majority of human history, has been engraved in the collective memory, at least culturally, and, together with the tendency towards linear thinking, has led to a rather pessimistic perspective on the possibilities of growth. The second idea of the _stationary state_ paradigm, according to which an end to economic growth is normatively desirable, is implicitly anticipated by Malthus in its contours. Namely, when he argued that population growth had to be curbed in order to maintain humanity's standard of living - ergo for Malthus, further growth, even if related to population, is normatively undesirable, as approaching its natural limits leads to mass pauperisation, pandemics and famine. The same pattern of argumentation can be found, in relation to the growth of economic activity, among many representatives of the _steady state_ paradigm, who postulate from a neo-Malthusian position that economic growth is not possible in the long term due to the scarcity of resources and that the attempt to continue to grow will lead to the destruction of the basis of human life in the long term (cf. e.g. Schmelzer and Vetter 2021, p.19; cf. Daly 2012, p.11). The concrete, more far-reaching second idea that an end to economic growth is not only normatively desirable due to natural limits and thus to avert the destruction of one's own livelihood was established primarily by thinkers after Malthus. ## 3.2 The origins of the second idea The general idea that striving for a higher level of prosperity is not worth striving for and should be rejected for moral reasons is already very pronounced in early Christianity, which negates the value of this life in favour of a promise of salvation in the hereafter. The New Testament admonishes: "Do not heap up treasures on earth. [...] Rather, lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven." (Luther Bible 2017, Mt 6, 19 - 20) Both the early Christians and the Christian philosophers of scholasticism, such as Augustine of Hippo, saw the pursuit of material possessions as something sinful and glorified asceticism. They were only concerned with the economy insofar as they analysed it for its possible fit with religious principles, and thus for its righteousness or sinfulness (cf. Friedman 2021, pp. 51 - 53). This early Christian perspective, which ascribes something disreputable to the accumulation of material goods and financial transactions, shaped and continues to shape normative thinking in European culture in the long term. Its echoes can be heard again and again among some representatives of the _stationary state_ paradigm, especially when they argue with intuitions that are not further substantiated. However, the concrete concept within philosophy that a _stationary state_ is generally desirable in normative terms was first articulated and effectively popularised by John Stuart Mill in his book _Principles of Political Economy,_ published in 1848. In it, Mill endorses the idea established by Smith and Malthus that there are natural limits to economic growth and that humanity will inevitably reach a _stationary state_ in which capital and population stagnate (and thus, in today's terminology, GDP per capita) - however, Mill explicitly criticises the idea established by Smith, which was still prevalent at the time, that an end to growth would be a bad thing (cf. Mill 2009, p. 593), thereby initiating the change to a paradigm in political philosophy that views the end of growth as something normatively desirable, and which still exists today. **Mill's arguments can be summarised as follows:** **1. controlling population growth or reducing the population** - as already proposed by Malthus - **is,** according to Mill, **necessary anyway**, regardless of the existence of growth, in order to raise the standard of living of mankind (cf. Mill 2009, p.593). According to Mill, the horror of the _stationary state_ in Smith and Malthus is primarily that the population grows beyond the available amount of vital capital and therefore becomes impoverished and decimates itself. According to Mill, however, this can be prevented by controlling or reducing the population, which is normatively desirable anyway, so that this horror loses its effect for Mill (cf. Mill 2009, p.593). **2. economic growth or an increase in productivity is only a relevant issue for "the backward countries of the world",** while "in those most advanced" (cf. Mill 2004, p.593) - i.e. the Western European countries of the 1840s, which at the time had an annual GDP per capita of around $2,500 (Maddison Project Database 2020) - all the benefits of economic activity or a sufficiently high level of prosperity have actually already been achieved. A certain amount more economic growth might still be possible, but Mill sees "very little reason for desiring it" due to the level of prosperity already achieved, as he assumes that more absolute prosperity would make people neither "better" nor "happier" (cf. Mill 2004, p.594). He also expresses scepticism towards technological progress: "Hithero it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being." (Mill 2004, p.595) **3. the only thing that really matters in advanced economies is "better distribution**", "of which one indispensable means is a stricter restraint on population" (cf. Mill 2004, p.593). Instead of focussing on more growth, we should instead be concerned with the fairest and most egalitarian distribution of existing prosperity. Such a just and egalitarian society is normatively desirable. **4. the _stationary state is_ a better starting point for such a just society.** If a greater accumulation of wealth is not possible, people will inevitably concentrate more on distribution issues. The just society is therefore "more naturally allied with that [stationary] state than with any other" (cf. Mill 2004, p.594). Accordingly, according to Mill, growth is even an obstacle to achieving a just society. Arguments 2, 3 and 4 in particular, according to which there is already enough prosperity and more growth is not desirable, it is only a matter of forming a just society through the right distribution and that such a distribution would be easier in a _stationary state_, had a great impact in political philosophy. After economics established itself as an independent science at the end of the 19th century and especially in the course of the 20th century and thus increasingly distanced itself from its moral philosophical roots, a two-world thinking emerged in academic discourse with regard to political economy. Ethics and economics diverged into two different spheres with little interaction with each other. On the one hand, this led to specialist economics becoming uncritical with regard to the normative foundations of economic activity. On the other hand, it also led to a tendency in practical philosophy to stop reflecting on economic categories (cf. Ulrich 2008, p.66). In the course of this academic specialisation and separation of functions, philosophers generally became less and less concerned with the concrete nature of economic phenomena such as growth, its limits and its causes. Instead, in the field of political philosophy, they turned more to questions of distribution, while the premises established by Mill were largely adopted uncritically and paradigmatically. How wealth is created, whether growth is necessary and related questions no longer seemed to be pressing issues after Mill established the primacy of distribution over wealth creation. This becomes particularly clear when you look at the most influential works of political philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries: Even though John Rawls drafts an alternative theory of justice to the utilitarianism advocated by Mill in his _A Theory of Justice_ from 1971, he adopts the assertions established by Mill with regard to growth. Accordingly, Rawls does not address this issue at all in his work and merely refers in footnotes to the fact that he explicitly agrees with Mill's position (cf. Rawls 2000, p. 107). Rawls also agrees with Mill's fourth argument and echoes the sentiment of Christian scholasticism, according to which the pursuit of wealth is an obstacle to achieving justice: "It is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high material standard [...] To achieve this state of things great wealth is not necessary. In fact, beyond some point it is more likely to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless distraction at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness." (Rawls 2005, p.290) In Robert Nozick's libertarian counter-proposal _Anarchy, State and Utopia_, published in 1974 as a response to Rawls, _there is_ not even a single word about economic growth. Economic growth is also not addressed in the work of communitarian philosopher Michael J. Sandel - neither in his 2009 book _Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?_ nor in _What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets_ from 2012, which deals with the moral dimensions of the market economy. In _Democracy's Discontent: A New Edition for Our Perilous Times_, published in 2022, Sandel then identifies the political focus on economic growth as one of the causes of the neglect of civic values and the political tensions in the USA (cf. Sandel 2022, pp.14, 17). Even Martha Nussbaum, who deals intensively with development policy and global justice in her work, addresses economic growth only rudimentarily in her work and argues that the focus should not be on it, but rather on justice, people's freedoms and empowerment, following the _Capabilites Approach_ developed by her and Amartya Sen, without analysing in depth how these are related to economic growth (cf. Nussbaum 2013, p. 51 & p.194). Even if the latter three philosophers do not explicitly advocate the _stationary state_ paradigm and their positions are compatible with a rejection of this paradigm, they seem to be at least influenced by this paradigm to exclude growth as a relevant factor for their theories. This leads to gaps and errors in their theories, since, as later sections of this thesis explain, the prevalence of civic values, freedoms and democratic institutions is significantly related to economic growth. While growth was still a relevant factor for normative considerations for Adam Smith, who considered himself a moral philosopher, today it no longer plays a significant role in political philosophy, at least in mainstream discourse. # 4.            The limits of growth The aim of this paper is primarily to elaborate on the normative meaning of growth and thus above all to criticise the second idea of the _stationary state_ paradigm, i.e. the idea that growth is normatively irrelevant or undesirable. However, the first idea of the paradigm must also be addressed at this point - at least briefly - as the second idea of the paradigm is to a certain extent born out of the first. ## 4.1 The limits are too far in the future The widespread view that constant growth is not possible is generally based on one of two arguments, which are explained in the following refutation: **1) Marginal _utility argument._** According to this argument, the inputs of growth - such as labour or capital - are subject to diminishing marginal utility. Ergo, the increase in input leads to a proportionally smaller and smaller increase in output until the marginal utility and thus the increase reach zero. This argument has its roots in classical and neoclassical growth theories, which identify population growth, resource consumption and/or capital accumulation as the main drivers of growth. However, current endogenous growth theories show that the cumulative effects of knowledge and technology on productivity growth do not reduce the marginal utility of the factors of production (cf. Muzhani 2014, p.326). Based on current growth theories, constant growth is therefore possible as long as humanity continues to accumulate knowledge and technology. This process does not appear to be slowing down in its exponential nature at present - on the contrary, in view of current developments, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence and robotics, an explosion of intelligence and thus an enormous increase in growth rates can be expected in the foreseeable future (cf. Bostrom 2017, p.2). **2) _Planetary limits argument._** This argument postulates that economic growth is limited by the limits of terrestrial ecosystems to cope with externalities of economic activity such as environmental degradation, emissions and resource consumption. In particular, the catastrophic consequences of global warming caused by industrial emissions have fuelled the idea in recent decades that the pursuit of further growth would ultimately lead to the destruction of the planet and thus the basis of human existence. The assumption that economic growth would destroy the basis of human life and thus set itself a limit is above all the premise underlying so-called post-growth or degrowth theories (cf. Schmelzer and Vetter 2021, p.19). However, these assumptions are based on an outdated economic understanding in which economic growth is inevitably accompanied by a higher throughput of resources and rising emissions (cf. Aghion 2023, p. 174) - for current growth theories, however, the accumulation of knowledge is central. Effects such as an increasing dematerialisation of the economy, better pricing of externalities through regulations and increases in the recycling rate lead to the empirically measurable effect that emissions and resource consumption have decoupled from growth in the most advanced economies in recent decades and are currently falling (cf. Ritchie 2021). The limits of our planet in terms of resources and ecosystems do not appear to be a serious obstacle to further economic growth, as this can also go hand in hand with a reduction in resource consumption and emissions and is already doing so in many countries. In addition, the wealthiest societies in particular have the best opportunities to take measures to protect the environment. Furthermore, any existing planetary limits that are relevant to the absolute size of the economy appear to be of significance in the medium term at most. In the long term, it can be assumed that humanity can and will expand its habitat to other planets (cf. Beckstead 2014). In view of the fact that our universe is estimated to be home to around 1025 planets (cf. Siegel 2022) and that humanity would need billions of years to reach them all, let alone utilise them economically, even if we were to expand at the speed of light, it can be assumed that "the ultimate limits [...] are probably tied to the energy output and computational capacity of the universe" (cf. Moller 2011, p. 182). All hard, physical limits to economic growth within our universe thus seem so unattainable for humanity at the present time as if they did not exist. To summarise, it can be argued that, at least on the basis of current growth theories and the growth potential still available to humanity, a hard limit to economic growth cannot be identified in the foreseeable future. Even if there is a limit for absolute economic growth set by the framework conditions of our universe, it seems implausible that humanity will reach this limit in the foreseeable future, if at all, which makes these limits largely irrelevant for current discussions. ## 4.2 Optimistic induction and growth bet Another reason for not assuming any limits to growth relevant to current normative discussions is that the history of economics and philosophy is littered with failed predictions regarding this limit. Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Karl Marx, John Keynes, Herman Daly and many other influential economists and philosophers assumed that they were already at the point in human history at which the limits to growth had been reached or would soon be reached. To illustrate this with two examples - although such statements can be found among all the authors just mentioned: Adam Smith assumed that the Netherlands had already grown close to its maximum level of prosperity in his time (cf. Smith 2007, p.79) - at that time, per capita GDP in the Netherlands was $4,431, today it is around $47,474 (Maddison Project Database 2020). Herman Daly wrote in 1977 that achieving the level of prosperity of the USA at that time was impossible for all four billion people existing at the time and certainly not for an even larger world population (cf. Daly 2012, p.5). In 1977, per capita GDP in the USA was around $9,452. Global GDP per capita in 2021, with a world population about twice as large, was $12,236 (World Bank Open Data 2023). The impossible, according to Daly, has happened. Historically, the growth potential has therefore always been systematically underestimated. Even if this is an induction, this experience suggests that we are also likely to underestimate growth potential today. Optimistically, we could induce from this that a great deal of growth is still possible, so that from the perspective of future generations, our current level of development will appear as precarious as that of Smith's time, for example. It follows from this optimistic induction that the maximum achievable plateau of prosperity and thus the limits of economic growth cannot be realistically estimated and that we can still hope for a lot of growth. If we also accept the premise that further economic growth is normatively desirable (which the paper goes on to elaborate), then it follows that we should act as if no immediate limits were imposed on growth as long as we see no evidence to the contrary. Because if we assume hard, immediate limits to growth and then, guided by this, no longer pursue growth politically and no longer try to achieve any further growth, it could happen that we are wrong. In that case, we would have foregone desirable growth simply because of our misconception that none would be possible. It is therefore more sensible to bet on this and act as if there is still more growth potential until it is actually exhausted. # 5.            The normative value of perpetual growth According to Brian Kogelmann, normative arguments in favour of economic growth can generally be divided into two categories: _wealth-sensitive_ and _wealth-insensitive arguments_, or wealth-dependent and wealth-independent arguments (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 478). Wealth-sensitive arguments imply that growth is only necessary to achieve a normatively desirable level of prosperity, which is why: "If a country is sufficiently rich, then a wealth-sensitive argument will not advocate growth. By contrast, a wealth-insensitive argument will say that all countries should pursue growth regardless of their current level of wealth." (ibid.)  If growth is to have a normative meaning in general, the justification for the normative value of growth must therefore be primarily independent of the level of prosperity of the society in question. Arguments that suggest that further growth enables the achievement of a defined, normatively desirable level of prosperity do not invalidate the second basic idea of the _stationary state_ paradigm. They only attribute a temporary normative value to growth as a means of achieving this _stationary state_ level of prosperity. In doing so, they merely postpone the point at which the paradigm applies again into the future. In order to show that economic growth in itself has a significant normative meaning - in the sense that it is always normatively desirable for a society to grow economically - it is therefore important to develop arguments in favour of growth that are independent of prosperity (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 478). At its core, the second idea of the _stationary state paradigm is_ therefore primarily based on a rejection of arguments that are independent of prosperity. However - and this is where this thesis contradicts Kogelmann - prosperity-based arguments in favour of growth can, under certain circumstances, function as effective arguments against the _stationary state_ paradigm, albeit not in principle, but in practice. Namely, when they set the maximum normatively desirable level of prosperity far beyond what humanity has achieved or could achieve. For example, an argument that locates the normatively desirable level of prosperity of humanity at the level of a type III civilisation on the Kardashov scale (cf. Kardashev 1967, p.219) and normatively upgrades any growth in this direction would in principle not refute the _stationary state_ paradigm. However, it would shift the _stationary state_ so far into the uncertain future that the paradigm would lose all practical relevance from the perspective of all people living today and their immediate descendants. Prosperity-based arguments of this kind will therefore also be discussed below. According to Kogelmann, _wealth-insensitive arguments_ in favour of economic growth can ultimately be differentiated into indirect and direct arguments. Indirect arguments do not assume that economic growth is always better, but that preventing growth would require morally reprehensible measures (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 479). While direct arguments assume that growth itself has a positive normative value, as it brings about desirable conditions. This distinction is followed in the categorisation and evaluation of the following arguments. ## 5.1 The immorality of the growth freeze Kogelmann himself identifies only one argument for perpetual growth, namely the indirect argument that "we are committed to continued economic growth - not because there is a direct argument in defence of growth, but because _stopping_ growth would require actions that are morally objectionable" (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p.483 - 484). Kogelmann's argument can be summarised as follows (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 485): _1._      _Under the right social conditions, economic growth will take care of itself in the long term._ _2._     _In order to stop economic growth, a society would have to change these growth-promoting conditions._ _3._     _However, we have independent moral reasons to maintain these conditions, regardless of their effect on economic growth._ _4._     _Changing these conditions would be morally wrong._ _5._     _Accordingly, it would not be possible to prevent economic growth in a morally acceptable way, and we are thus indirectly committed to further growth._ Of the conditions mentioned in premise 3, Kogelmann identifies three categories (cf. ibid. p.485), which are also confirmed by endogenous growth theories (cf. Aghion 2023, p.32, 292): Firstly, building on Acemoglu and Robinson's _institutional theory of economic growth,_ he argues that growth is enabled and promoted by inclusive political and economic institutions that characterise democracy. If one wanted to stop growth, this would only be possible by abolishing democratic institutions (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 485). Secondly, building on the work of Joel Mokyr, Kogelmann argues that economic growth is primarily driven by the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge and thus by freedom of research and thought. A state could therefore only suppress growth in the long term with a regime of censorship and bans. However, such undemocratic interference in individual autonomy is morally unacceptable (cf. ibid., p.486). Thirdly, Kogelmann argues, building on the work of Deirdre McCloskey, that the phase of global growth since the Enlightenment is due to the fact that an ethical framework has been established according to which people involved in trade and seeking economic advancement are treated with dignity.  Based on this, economic growth could only be suppressed in the long term if society stratified itself again, as was often the case in earlier feudal societies, and discriminated against those involved in trade and trying to rise economically - something that would not be morally acceptable (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p.487). The obvious first objection to Kogelmann's argument is that it is quite logically possible that the conditions he describes as both normatively desirable and growth-promoting could also exist in a _stationary state_ - he already addresses this objection himself in _We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth._  According to Kogelmann, the mere logical possibility of this coexistence is not an objection to his argument as long as this possibility is not also plausible - and according to Kogelmann it is not. First and foremost, it is plausible that growth-promoting conditions actually lead to growth if they exist (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 487). Kogelmann explains that representatives of the _stationary states_ paradigm such as Mill or Keynes often assume in their theories that, once a certain level of material prosperity has been achieved, all people would voluntarily work less or not at all and would no longer strive for an increase in prosperity or wealth. This would mean that even under normatively desirable and growth-promoting conditions, such as the existence of democratic institutions, growth would come to a standstill (cf. ibid.). There are two objections to this assumption of the representatives of the _stationary state_ paradigm: 1) One objection that Kogelmann himself does not make is that growth can proceed even with falling working hours as long as the increase in productivity through innovation more than compensates for this. An increase in economic growth despite rapidly falling working hours is also something that has already been empirically proven to have happened and continues to happen. For example, the average working time per capita has more than halved in most countries over the past 150 years (see Giattino 2020). A continuation of this trend seems plausible, especially with an increasing degree of automation of economic production through the implementation and further development of artificial intelligence, for example. This could eventually even progress to the point where even the growth-driving research and development of new technologies is automated and requires little or no human input. The possibility of AI reaching a point of singularity at which it can automatically develop itself and other technologies further seems plausible (cf. Bostrom 2014, p. 90). From such a point, economic growth could continue even if humanity did not work at all. In his post-humanist revision of Marxist dialectics, Nick Land, for example, predicts the emergence of just such a technocapitalist singularity, in which the expansive dynamics of capitalism take on a life of their own and make humans redundant as an input factor, as the actual logical end of history (cf. Land 2013, p.16). 2) The second objection raised by Kogelmann himself against this assumption of the representatives of the _stationary state_ is that the changes in the morality and human nature of people assumed by Mill or Keynes upon reaching the _stationary state_ are not plausible and are not explained by them (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p.488). Why should people stop working or no longer strive for wealth just because they themselves or society have reached a certain material level? For some people, work may only be a purely instrumental way to achieve a certain level of material goods. These people would indeed swap work completely for leisure at any time once they had reached this level, but there is no doubt that not everyone would. Otherwise, for example, there would be no billionaires like Elon Musk, Bernard Arnault or Mark Zuckerberg who are still working even though they have accumulated more wealth than they could reasonably spend in their lifetime. For many people, work obviously not only fulfils an instrumental purpose, but also serves to satisfy basic post-material needs such as the opportunity to come together with others in a community, to develop skills, to feel useful, to realise oneself and to gain social recognition. The last aspect of social recognition in particular acts as a driver of further growth. It seems to be human nature that one's own well-being does not necessarily depend on the absolute level of prosperity, but very much on the relative comparison with others, i.e. one's own socio-economic status (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p.489).  In fact, the pursuit of differentiation through social status has an evolutionary and neuronal basis (see Koski et al. 2015), so it seems implausible that the pursuit of social differentiation through the achievement of relatively higher prosperity should simply disappear for a large part of humanity just because a certain level of prosperity has been reached.  Or as the economist Benjamin Friedman observes: "The desire to get ahead compared to other people, just like the desire to advance beyond one's own prior experience, creates a motivation for economic effort that persists no matter how high living standards rise." (Friedman 2006 p.87) In fact, Kogelmann's defence contains the core of the first arguments that are independent of prosperity, which he himself overlooked and which are developed in the following sections. ## 5.2 Maintaining subjective well-being Should we pursue consistent growth to become happier? In fact, there is a strong positive correlation between a country's GDP per capita and self-reported satisfaction with one's life. People in wealthier countries report being happier and more satisfied on average (see Ortiz-Ospina & Roser 2017). However, there is disagreement in the specialist literature as to whether a higher level of prosperity can actually make people happier from a certain point onwards. The so-called _Easterlin paradox_, which goes back to empirical studies by economist Richard Easterlin, is particularly influential in the discourse. According to these studies, US Americans did not become happier on average between 1946 and 1970, despite an enormous increase in prosperity (see Easterlin 1974, p. 90) - from which it is often concluded that from a certain point of prosperity, at which all basic needs are met, more prosperity no longer leads to more happiness. However, more recent studies, such as the particularly well-received one by Stevenson and Wolfers, find in part "no evidence that countries become satiated - the positive income-happiness relationship holds for both developed and developing nations." (cf. Stevenson & Wolfers 2008, p. 9) One possible explanation for why in some empirical studies - such as Easterlin's - self-reported satisfaction in wealthier countries seems to stagnate after a certain point is that the questionnaires they use do not measure actual satisfaction, but simply self-reported satisfaction as communicated to the outside world. However, how people talk about their own lives seems to depend heavily on linguistic conventions and framing effects. These also seem to adapt over time as people develop new expectations of how happy they can be. Accordingly, a constant level of self-reported life satisfaction may actually imply an increase in real life satisfaction, as improvements in quality of life lead to the terms used to communicate satisfaction and happiness taking on more ambitious meanings as reference points shift (cf. Cowen 2018, pp.43-44). It seems plausible to assume that people's capacity for happiness and satisfaction is not unlimited. Even if the level of prosperity in no country in the world today is probably already so high that no further increases in subjective well-being would be possible through growth, a saturation point will probably be reached at some point. So even if the _Easterlin paradox_ is probably not yet true, it will probably become true sooner or later (cf. Moller 2011, p. 182). _Stationary-state arguments_ often assume, especially in utilitarian forms such as Mill's but also Keynes' (see Keynes 2010, p.327), that once we have reached this saturation point of happiness, we would have no reason to pursue further growth, or even that pursuing further growth would prevent us from becoming happier. However, this assumption overlooks two relevant objections: 1) _Subjective happiness is not the only relevant factor that makes a life good_.  A good and desirable life encompasses more than just subjective well-being or happiness, but many other values.  A classic thought experiment that illustrates this is that of Robert Nozick's _Experience Machine_ (see Nozick & Nagel 2013, p. 43). But even in classical philosophy, for example, the Aristotelian concept of the good life as _eudaimonia_ encompasses much more than just subjective well-being or hedonistic happiness (cf. Rapp & Corcilius 2021, p.147). These various concepts and values that make up a good life can be better realised with an increasing level of prosperity, as "Wealthier societies offer greater opportunities and freedoms to pursue preferred concepts of happiness, even if this privilege does not always show up in the measurement of [self-reported happiness]" (cf. Cowen 2018, p.45).nFurthermore, there is a tendency for people to resign themselves to certain conditions after a while and to be subjectively just as happy as if they did not exist, as illustrated by the _disability paradox, for example_. According to this paradox, many people who suffer severe disabilities as a result of accidents often report being just as happy as they were before the accidents. Even if in this case the subjective happiness between the state before and after the accident should be identical and not just a linguistic adaptation, the quality of life seems to be objectively better and more desirable regardless of the subjective satisfaction before the accident, as the person had a higher level of well-being in the form of, for example, greater freedom, higher life expectancy and less pain (cf. Moller 2011, p. 189). For these reasons, and because subjective well-being is difficult to measure empirically, the philosopher Dan Moller suggests focussing on objective, externally measurable values for people's well-being with regard to discussions about the possibilities of economic growth to improve our lives.  He lists life expectancy, health, the well-being of loved ones and goods that contribute to self-realisation as examples of these values (cf. Moller 2011, p. 187). This argument will be developed in more detail in the next section 5.3. 2) _Growth may no longer increase subjective well-being above a certain level of prosperity, but it does help to maintain it._ Kogelmann writes that "for the happiness argument to be wealth insensitive, it must be true that increased wealth always results in greater happiness" (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p.481), something that seems implausible, at least in the long term, as described. Growth can presumably not contribute endlessly to an increase in subjective well-being, but there is nevertheless a reason why we should strive for constant growth in terms of happiness. There is a possibility for a prosperity-independent argument in favour of continuous growth that Kogelmann has overlooked, namely that continuous growth contributes to maintaining a high level of subjective well-being - and this seems to be the case. After certain basic needs have been met, people's subjective well-being seems to increase primarily due to relative improvements in their living conditions and is maintained from a certain point onwards. This is also an explanation for the stagnating satisfaction in the _Easterlin paradox,_ but also the frequent return to a baseline of satisfaction that describes the _disability paradox:_ After a certain period of time, people get used to what they have or are, and the satisfaction they derive from the status quo decreases (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 82). Whether people perceive themselves as happy and are satisfied with their lives then depends heavily on how they evaluate their circumstances in relative comparison. Whereby "[...] the most obvious benchmark people have in mind when they draw such comparisons is their own past experience. People who live better now than they did before, or better than they recall their parents living, are likely to think they are doing well. Those who look back on better times-better for them and their families, that is-think they are not. As a result, psychological studies have repeatedly confirmed that people's satisfaction depends less on the level of their income than on how it is changing" (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 82) . If people have the impression that they are relatively worse off than at an earlier point in their lives, their life satisfaction generally decreases, even if they have a very high standard of living. This is why depression and dissatisfaction increase sharply during recessions, for example, even in prosperous countries (see Cheves et al. 2018, p. 982), even if these recessions do not lower the level of prosperity below the point previously identified as the saturation point for satisfaction by the Easterlin studies, for example. The situation is similar with economic stagnation: "once growth stops-no matter how high people's incomes have risen-it is only a question of time before habits adapt and the sense of heightened well-being dissipates. Not only does a better standard of living come to seem familiar and customary, so too do changes like improved working conditions, fewer hours on the job, and superior medical treatment. Only if growth and change persist will people continue to feel better off."  (Friedman 2006, p.83). So if the highest possible subjective well-being in the form of happiness and satisfaction is normatively desirable, this is most likely to be increased and maintained in a constantly growing world. A _stationary state_ would lead to dissatisfaction and frustration in the long term due to the stagnation that prevails in it. ## 5.3 Objective improvements to life When John Stuart Mill wrote in 1848 that there was now enough wealth in the advanced nations of his time and that all that mattered was the right distribution, GDP per capita in Western Europe was around $2,500. Today, even in the poorest region of the world, sub-Saharan Africa, it is $3,500 (see Maddison Project Database 2020) - and hardly anyone today would want to claim that people in sub-Saharan Africa are doing well enough economically. But not only are people in Africa today richer on average than people in Western Europe in John Stuart Mill's time - statistically speaking, they and the entire world population are much better off on several objective levels. For example, life expectancy in Europe in the 1850s was only around 36 years - whereas in Africa as a whole, life expectancy today is around 62 years, and in Europe 77 years (see Roser et al. 2022). More growth leads to a higher level of prosperity, which empirically has always been accompanied in human history by objective improvements in the quality of life, such as increasing life expectancy, better nutrition and health, better access to goods such as education, leisure and travel as well as more opportunities for individual self-realisation (cf. Moller 2011, p. 187). Although this is a prosperity-dependent argument in favour of growth, it deserves closer examination. This example using Mill not only illustrates once again the difficulties of assessing growth potential, but also raises several questions. Firstly, what actually constitutes a sufficiently high level of prosperity from which mankind should be satisfied with a _stationary state_. Mill seemed to assume that the general prosperity in the Western European states of his time would be sufficient for a good life if only it were fairly distributed. However, a world with the level of prosperity of the 1850s, even if it were distributed in an absolutely egalitarian way, probably seems like a dystopia to most people living in the 21st century on closer inspection. The economic productivity per capita at that time was not even sufficient to ensure a balanced diet, and it did not have the production capacity to provide medical goods that are considered essential today, such as antibiotics and vaccinations. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic illustrates this very well as an example: after the first infections occurred in December 2019, it took just one year for the first millions of people to be vaccinated and for large-scale vaccination campaigns to begin in several countries (see CDC 2023). A global economy with significantly lower productivity at the level of Mill's time would not have been able to raise resources for such rapid development, production and distribution of vaccines and to contain the pandemic. In 2020 alone, governments worldwide spent around $720 billion on fighting the pandemic (see WHO 2022, p. 7) - and even if the equally immense private investments are not included, this already amounts to around 50% of global GDP in 1850, but not even 0.63% of global GDP in 2018 (Maddison Project Database 2020). In total, it is estimated that 14.4 million lives were saved worldwide in the first year of the vaccination campaign (see Watson et al. 2022). The fact that the global economy today is capable of such an achievement, which has saved and prolonged the lives of millions of people, is an objective improvement on the 1850s. Such an achievement would not have been possible just a few decades ago, and even if, as the _Easterlin studies_ suggest, subjective well-being in the form of happiness should not be higher today than it was a few decades ago, today's level of prosperity has nevertheless contributed to people being objectively better off and being able to enjoy this happiness longer and more carefree thanks to better healthcare. It can be assumed that John Mill could not even imagine the productivity of our current global economy and thus its ability to tackle such global crises as pandemics - he did not even consider today's level of prosperity possible based on the first idea of the _stationary state_ paradigm, and was generally sceptical about the possibility of technology and prosperity improving people's lives at all (cf. Mill 2004, p.595).  This is also one of the mechanisms by which the first and second ideas of the paradigm are linked: Pessimism about the possibilities of greater prosperity to improve life leads to rejecting more growth, and instead looking at how a better world could be created from the status quo through more egalitarian distribution.  Because Mill did not believe that a world as prosperous as ours was possible, he did not consider it normatively desirable to strive for it. However, it is quite evident that the continued growth of the last 170 years since Mill's time has contributed more to the objective improvement of people's quality of life worldwide than any egalitarian distribution of Mill's status quo could have achieved. The same can be said of John Rawls: the massive global economic growth since the 1970s has done more to alleviate the suffering of the poorest and weakest in the world than the redistribution of the status quo favoured by Rawls in his time could ever have achieved. If a _stationary state is_ to be normatively desirable, then it seems obvious that humanity should only strive for it when it has exhausted the maximum normatively desirable objective improvements in the quality of life through the increase in further prosperity and further growth could actually no longer contribute to an objective improvement in the quality of life. But when will this point be reached - does it even exist? The answer is twofold: _Firstly_, we cannot really know, but we have good reason to believe that further increases in productivity would enable further objective increases in the quality of life. Just as Mill could not have imagined the possibilities of our global economy, which is around 80 times larger (see Maddison Project Database 2020), we probably cannot imagine the possibilities of a global economy that is many times more productive than ours today. The epistemic advantage we have over Mill today is that, unlike him, we can empirically look back not just on three decades of significant growth, but on two centuries (cf. Aghion 2023, p.21). This experience shows that, as philosopher Dan Moller, among others, argues, people have a natural tendency towards a _status quo bias, from which_ the current level of development appears normal and not in need of further improvement, which means that we systematically underestimate the achievability and possibilities of a more prosperous world (cf. Moller 2011, p.188). Based on this, we can try to avoid the _status quo bias_, extrapolate and surmise that a lot is still possible. For example, it is possible that further increases in productivity and innovations in the healthcare sector, and especially in genetic engineering, could enable people in a more advanced economy than the one we have today to extend their life expectancy to centuries or cure diseases such as cancer virtually at the touch of a button. This may seem like a miracle, but our economic and technological capabilities are already achieving things that can seem like miracles from a historical perspective. In 1836, for example, Nathan Rothschild, probably the richest man in the world at the time, died of a common infection, which today can usually be easily cured by antibiotics, even in the poorest of people (cf. Friedmann 2006, p.23). Today's luxury goods that make life more interesting, such as owning a yacht or travelling into space, could one day become as generally accessible as earlier luxury goods are generally accessible today. For example, in the 18th and 19th centuries, toilets were still a luxury good that was unaffordable for most people - during the reign of the Sun King Louis XIV, there was exactly one in the entire palace of Versailles with its 2,000 rooms (see FAZ 2017) - today, a toilet can be found in every flat in most cities. But ultimately these are only speculations - whether objective increases in the quality of life in most areas would be made possible by further growth or whether an insurmountable plateau will occur at some point, we can only know definitively when they have actually occurred. However, from the experience of the past two centuries, it seems morally imperative to strive for further growth, as this has empirically proven to be the most effective method of increasing the objective quality of life of most people. Secondly, there is at least one area in which there cannot actually be a plausible sufficiency of available economic productivity and thus a sufficiently high level of prosperity, namely in the capacity to combat existential risks. ## 5.4 Reduction of existential risks As the example of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic illustrates, a higher level of prosperity enables a society to respond better to crises, as it has a greater economic surplus that it can allocate to prevention or response without having to sacrifice vital goods elsewhere. Whether it is forest fires, famine, poverty, floods or disease outbreaks, a society with a more prosperous economy generally has more resources and capacity to respond and help those affected. It is hard to imagine a normative saturation point of economic prosperity from which it would not be desirable to be able to respond even more extensively and quickly to crises and reduce suffering, given all the various afflictions that plague humanity even in the wealthiest countries. For one type of crisis, however, it is not even plausible - namely the prevention of existential catastrophes. 65 million years ago, a 10 kilometre asteroid hit the earth and wiped out around 80% of all species living on earth (see Alvarez et al. 1980) - including the dinosaurs, who made the mistake of not building a global economy that invested a few per thousand of its output in space programmes. If such an asteroid had flown towards the earth a hundred years ago, nobody would be reading this bachelor's thesis today, for better or worse, because humanity would have followed the dinosaurs into non-existence. However, if today such an asteroid, even with twice or three times the mass, were on a collision course with the Earth, humanity now actually has the ability to use nuclear weapons to divert the asteroid from its course if detected in time, or at least to break it up to such an extent that the impact would not end in our extinction (cf. Lubin & Cohen 2022, p.16). The probability that such an asteroid will fly on a collision course with the Earth in the next hundred years is a low 1 in 1.5 million, and is one of the few major existential risks for which sufficient prevention is actually being carried out (cf. Ord 2021, p.69). However, we are currently defenceless against other existential risks. A gamma-ray burst or a supernova, for example, could virtually sterilise the surface of the earth in one fell swoop - the former probably happened 440 million years ago and led to the extinction of 85% of all species existing at that time (cf. Melott et al. 2004, p.19). A supervolcanic eruption, such as the Toba catastrophe 74,000 years ago, which almost wiped out humanity at the time, occurs around once every 80,000 years - and would probably not completely wipe out humanity today, but would kill billions and lead to the collapse of civilisation (cf. Ord 2021, p. 74). The fact that humanity is the only civilisation known to us in our 13.8 billion year old universe suggests that the emergence and survival of intelligent life forms like us is something extremely fragile and rare. Existential catastrophes seem to act as major filters that generally prevent this (cf. Hanson 1998). Humanity and life on earth in general have been very lucky so far not to have been wiped out by an existential catastrophe. However, luck will not ensure the long-term survival of humanity. Accordingly, we have a moral responsibility to increase the probability of this survival, because on the one hand, if all _moral agents_ are dead, _moral actions_ are no longer possible (cf. Ord 2021, p.55). Secondly, premature extinction would mean a loss of billions and billions of actual and potential human lives. Therefore, protection against existential risks or the achievement of a state of _existential security_ should be a top priority in politics and philosophy, as philosopher Toby Ord, among others, argues (cf. Ord 2021, p.6). The higher the level of prosperity of our civilisation, the greater the surplus of economic output that it can invest in preventing and coping with existential catastrophes. A civilisation that grows constantly increases its long-term chances of survival and its overall life expectancy as it grows - while a civilisation that stagnates in a _stationary state_ is inevitably confronted with what is likely to be a much earlier extinction. It seems implausible that a saturation point will ever be reached at which a civilisation actually has the resources to defend itself against all possible existential catastrophes - because there are several types of potential existential catastrophes such as massive stellar explosions, collisions of galaxies, a vacuum decay or certain forms of _unaligned AGI_, where even a spread to several solar systems would not be sufficient for survival (cf. Ord 2021, p. 184). If there is such a thing as a normatively desirable _stationary state_ in terms of maximum achievable and attained existential security, then it is probably at a level of prosperity at which humanity has spread to several galaxies or even universes - which is probably not possible. But every step towards this point means an increase in the life expectancy of our civilisation and an exponential increase in future human lives. Nick Bostrom, for example, estimates that every second of delay in the colonisation of our local supercluster leads to around 1013 to 1029 fewer future human lives (cf. Bostrom 2003, p.4). However, one problem that arises from economic growth with regard to existential risks is that it can also generate new anthropogenic existential risks in the medium term, such as the possibility of nuclear wars or the uncontrolled profiling of biological weapons. This aspect will be addressed again in the discussion section in Section 6 when it comes to including this aspect in the determination of an appropriate growth rate. ## 5.5 Non-zero-sum world Regardless of the existing level of prosperity, constant growth is normatively desirable because only a growing economy is an economic _non-zero-sum game_ in game theory terms. A stagnating economy, on the other hand, is an economic _zero-sum game_. If an economy stagnates and per capita capital therefore remains constant, a single person can only increase their individual share of total capital if at least one other person loses capital - there are only as many gains as losses (cf. Friedman 2006, p.86). Mutually beneficial economic cooperation for all actors thus becomes impossible in society as a whole, as aggregated transactions represent a zero-sum game. Not only does a world in which one person's economic advantage inevitably represents another person's disadvantage appear more unfair than a growing world in which everyone can benefit from co-operation on the whole - it also leads to negative changes in people's moral attitudes, as it promotes a _zero-sum_ mindset. Conversely, a constantly growing economy promotes a normatively desirable _positive-sum mindset_. This argument was most prominently developed by the economist Benjamin Friedman in his 2005 book _The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth._ Based on an analysis of historical data from the USA and various European countries, Friedman argues that periods of economic stagnation or decline are accompanied by an increase in intolerance, selfishness, resentment, social regression and an erosion of trust. Conversely, periods of stable economic growth lead to greater openness, tolerance and acceptance of pro-social legislation and democracy (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 2, 86). The mechanism behind this phenomenon can be understood as follows: If a society grows sufficiently strongly, it approximates what game theory describes as a _positive sum game._ An individual A can maintain and improve his own standard of living in it, while other individuals B also improve their standard of living. Costs that A may incur by improving the standard of living of B, such as increased taxes to subsidise education or social welfare, are offset by economic growth and the mutually positive effect of cooperation, or at least are not accompanied by a noticeable deterioration in one's own position (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 95). The bottom line is that both A and B can be better off at the same time. Such a society provides individual A with incentives for altruistic or at least neutral behaviour towards his fellow human beings B. If, on the other hand, the economy stagnates or shrinks, any improvement in the prosperity of one individual is inevitably accompanied by a deterioration in the condition of another person. If A is better off, B is worse off, and vice versa (ibid. p. 85). Incentives systematically arise in society to adopt a _zero-sum mindset_ that identifies the welfare and social mobility of others as a threat to one's own (cf. Różycka-Tran et al. 2015, p. 528). Since people tend to evaluate their own well-being on the basis of relative benchmarks - e.g. how they are doing economically compared to a previous point in time or their fellow human beings - their well-being depends heavily on whether they feel that their living conditions are improving or deteriorating in relative terms (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 82). In addition, the human psyche has a pronounced tendency towards loss aversion or the _possession effect_. Potential and actual losses of things we already have are generally more unpleasant than the prospect of something new due to this loss aversion. Even the risk of suffering a loss motivates our behaviour (cf. Kahnemann 2012, p. 360).  The fear of losing out economically and being relegated therefore acts as a proportionally stronger motivator than the prospect of possibly rising economically. In a stagnating economy, the actual or even potential economic advancement of another person through an egalitarian social policy, for example, tends to be perceived as a threat and as an active disadvantage to oneself and others, while one's own potential advantages through such a policy are given less weight (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 86). This manifests itself in an increasing defensive attitude towards egalitarian social policy, but also often, consciously or unconsciously, in discriminatory behaviour such as racism in order to prevent the economic advancement of others or to secure a larger share of capital for oneself (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 86). In addition, the lack of relative improvement and stagnation in one's own life leads to greater comparisons with fellow human beings and thus to more envy, resentment, decreasing generosity and, in turn, even less tolerance (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 92). Finally, in such an intolerant climate, trust in fellow human beings and political institutions and thus the basis of democracy erodes more easily (cf. ibid.), which is also plausible in terms of game theory, as _non-zero-sum_ interactions are one of the foundations for the long-term development of cooperation and thus trust (cf. Axelrod 2006, p. 42). Friedman is not the only one to empirically identify such a strong correlation between economic growth and the prevalence of moral attitudes, which makes causality plausible: For the majority of human history, people lived in agrarian and feudal societies, which usually had hardly any noticeable economic growth and were therefore mostly _zero-sum economies._ These societies were often characterised by the prevalence of two characteristics, the second of which follows from the first: 1)     Zero-sum thinking: The general conviction that social relationships are antagonistic and that one's own success is only possible at the expense of others (cf. Foster 1965, p.67; cf. Różycka-Tran et al. 2015, p. 528). 2)     Extractive institutions. Exploitation of other people in the form of wars of conquest and slavery, discrimination based on birth in the form of class and caste systems, and the associated authoritarianism (cf. Wright 2001, p. 135; cf. Cowen 2018, p.31). Some evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists attribute the developments away from _zero-sum thinking_ and exploitative institutions in the course of human history towards more and more reciprocal altruism and finally the emergence and spread of liberal democracies to the increase in _non-zero-sumness_ in recent centuries through the implementation of technologies and institutions that promote it (cf. Wright 2001, p.22), the measurable result of which is economic growth. Slavery in particular, which has been practised in most agrarian societies around the world since the Bronze Age (cf. Encyclopedia Britannica 2023), began to decline in the course of history with increasing economic growth and the resulting growth in _non-zero-sumness_, until it was finally criminalised and began to disappear in more and more states in the course of industrialisation in the 19th century and thus accelerating growth (cf. Wright 2001, pp. 106, 151; Friedman 2006, p.226). However, the connection between growth and _zero-sum_ thinking and the associated negative behaviours can also be empirically proven at a less historical level. An analysis of psychometric analyses of 37 countries found a positive correlation between the prevalence of zero-sum _thinking_ and low GDP (see Różycka-Tran et al. 2015, p. 537). There is evidence of an increase in xenophobic and racist resentment, for example in European countries in the wake of the recessions caused by the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis (cf. Ghosh 2011, p.188). Friedman himself points to a positive correlation between phases of declining economic growth and the increase in Klu Klux Klan activities and discriminatory legislation in the USA in the 19th and early 20th centuries (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 128, 148 - 153). Davis and Knauss subjected the hypothesis that economic growth promotes support for egalitarian social policy to an empirical analysis with data from 84 countries - and found confirmation for a slightly modified hypothesis that this effect occurs more strongly with increasing growth and in less developed countries (cf. Davis & Knauss 2013). The rise of right-wing populism in the US since the 2008 financial crisis and the electoral success of Donald Trump in 2016 were also attributed by several economists to stagnation and regression, particularly in the so-called Rust Belt of the US, and the resulting resentment (see Komlos 2018, p.4). The phenomenon that growth promotes the emergence and maintenance of tolerant attitudes and inclusive institutions such as democracies through the creation of _non-zero-sumness is_ of great importance. These institutions are also among the conditions that current growth theories identify as the drivers of growth (cf. Kogelmann 2022, p. 485; cf. Aghion 2023, p.292). Based on this, various economists, including Friedman, postulate the concept of self-reinforcing feedback loops in the relationship between political institutions and growth. Growth promotes inclusive, democratic institutions, and these in turn promote growth, which leads to a self-reinforcing _virtuous circle._ Stagnation in turn promotes authoritarian, extractive institutions, which in turn promote stagnation in the long term, leading to _vicious circles_ (cf. Friedman 2006, p. 345). However, it should be emphasised that historically, _vicious circles_ are much more likely and it is much easier for a society to get into a _vicious circle_ than to get out again (cf. Friedman 2006, p.344), which makes it all the more important to prioritise the maintenance of growth politically. A society that produces as few or no economic "losers" as possible and that is open, tolerant and characterised by high social mobility, inclusive institutions and the absence of resentment and exclusionary attitudes such as racism is normatively desirable. However, such a society is best achieved and maintained if it is an economic _non-zero-sum game_. For it to be such a game, however, it must constantly grow economically. This means that constant economic growth is normatively desirable regardless of the level of prosperity a society has already achieved. # 6.            Restrictions and implications As elaborated in the previous section, contrary to the second idea of the _stationary state paradigm,_ the existence of growth is normatively relevant and a _stationary state is_ not desirable in principle. However, this does not necessarily mean that, conversely, maximising economic growth is always normatively desirable without restriction. In the following, possible limitations and objections to the setting of economic growth as a normative goal as well as the implications of such a goal are discussed. ## 6.1 Inclusive growth One shortcoming of GDP per capita as a measure of economic growth is that it only measures the aggregate economic growth of an entire society. However, it is often the case that while an economy grows as a whole, certain parts of the economy and society experience stagnation or even decline at the same time. One of the reasons for this is that growth is accompanied by creative destruction, which increases the value of economic output for society as a whole, but at the same time imposes costs on some individuals in the form of insolvencies and usually temporary job losses. The costs and benefits of growth can be distributed very unequally in a society under certain circumstances. In those parts of society that are primarily affected by the costs and do not participate in growth, the positive effects of growth often largely fail to materialise.  It is therefore possible that an economy as a whole may grow in the sense of rising GDP per capita, but that the positive effects of growth do not actually materialise for large sections of the population. Thus growth does not actually take place for subsections of the labour force, even if the overall economy is growing. The development of the USA in recent decades can be cited as an example of this. Even though the USA experienced an overall increase in real GDP per capita of 54.89% between 1990 and 2019 (World Bank Open Data 2023), the average real hourly wage for non-managerial employees largely stagnated between 1978 and 2018 (cf. DeSilver 2018). At the same time as the overall stagnation of non-managerial employees, the remuneration of managers increased massively during this period. For example, the CEOs of the 350 largest listed US companies saw their real remuneration increase by 1,460.2% between 1978 and 2021 (Bivens & Jori 2022).  On closer inspection, however, this stagnation below management level also represents a massive change for some sections of the population: for male employees, the median income fell by around 10% during this period, while it rose by around 25% for female employees in the same period (see Reeves et al. 2019). For male employees between the ages of 25 and 54 who have no higher education qualifications than high school, the average real income even fell by 18.2% between 1973 and 2015 (Binder & Bound 2019, p. 163). So while overall economic productivity has increased in the US over the last few decades and the economy as a whole has grown strongly, growth has not taken place in all parts of the economy. The benefits of overall growth have been unevenly distributed throughout society, so that not all parts of society have actually experienced growth.  As a result, from the perspective of large sections of the US population, their own economic situation has stagnated; and some groups, such as male non-academics, have even experienced an erosion of their income. As a result, as postulated by the theories in the previous section, dissatisfaction with democracy has risen among these growthless sections of the population (cf. Foa et al. 2020, p. 42); and their resentment fuelled by economic stagnation and erosion is one of the main drivers behind the rise of right-wing populism in recent years (cf. Komlos 2018, p.4). Among male non-academics, Trump was the most popular candidate in 2016 (cf. Jones 2018). If the positive effects of economic growth are to have an impact on society as a whole, it is essential that growth not only takes place at an aggregated level, but that as many sections of the population as possible actually participate in it. Accordingly, it is not enough to focus solely on the increase in GDP per capita; instead, it seems essential for a normative assessment to analyse how growth is distributed in society.   Government measures such as transfer payments or investments in social mobility, e.g. through education, can be useful interventions here in order to enable the broadest possible distribution of the fruits and thus the positive effects of growth. However, this can also lead to an obstructive paradox: As the acceptance of such egalitarian social policy, which distributes the fruits of growth more equally, is promoted by the presence of growth, while its absence tends to strengthen anti-egalitarian tendencies, the _vicious circles_ described in section 5.5 can also set in here. This can also be observed in the USA, where the groups that participate least in economic growth are often predominantly in favour of right-wing populist, anti-egalitarian policies. However, this also shows that the exclusive focus on the fair distribution of existing prosperity often favoured by representatives of the _stationary state_ cannot be sustainable in practice. Societies can only become economic _non-zero-sum games_ through growth, which create the basis for the acceptance and feasibility of such redistribution measures through _non-zero-sum thinking_ and pro-social attitudes. One of the implications of the arguments presented in this paper is therefore that the popularised exclusion of growth by representatives of the _stationary state_ when considering the most egalitarian distribution possible is a mistake. There is not, as you often assume, a fundamental antagonism between growth and egalitarian distribution, but the relationship is much more complex. The two even appear to be complementary to a certain extent in the long term. Neglecting growth undermines the possibility of egalitarian social policy, while neglecting the question of distribution in turn undermines the foundations of growth and its positive effects. Accordingly, a consequentialist normative assessment of redistributive measures would seem to have to take into account their impact on economic growth. A second related implication is that the focus of social policy measures should not only be on distribution, but also on making economic growth as inclusive as possible.  In practice, this means, for example, that investments in social mobility through educational measures, which make it easier for disadvantaged groups to find new jobs in growing sectors and experience rising incomes, should be prioritised more than mere monetary benefits. Such measures not only enable those affected to achieve the increase in subjective well-being discussed in 5.2 through the relative improvement in socio-economic status, they also contribute to more growth and a better distribution of the resulting positive effects. ## 6.2 The optimal growth rate Growth is always normatively relevant and desirable because it instrumentally helps us to achieve and maintain a wide range of normatively desirable states, but does this mean that we should always consider maximising growth as normatively desirable? The answer seems to be _no._ On the one hand, the effects brought about by growth are not necessarily always at the top of the ethical and political agenda. For example, it can be assumed that a country waging a war of defence against a genocidal invader has other short-term priorities than the long-term preservation of its democratic institutions through a positive growth rate. On the other hand, an undifferentiated pursuit of maximum growth risks cannibalising its positive effects, as excessively rapid and qualitatively unsustainable growth in particular can generate negative externalities. With this in mind, a moderate growth rate that increases the positive effects of growth but avoids harmful excess by weighing up various factors often appears to be more desirable in normative terms than the maximum theoretically possible. These factors include, among others: **_1. creative destruction_.** Higher growth rates are enabled by higher rates of Creative Destruction, which in turn is enabled by investment in innovation. However, high rates of Creative Destruction generate stress and health-inducing negative externalities in the form of economic volatility, unemployment and increasing socio-economic inequality. These negative externalities can outweigh the positive effects of growth in the short term and undermine the institutional foundations of growth in the long term. Accordingly, it makes sense to invest in measures such as social security systems that mitigate these negative externalities of creative destruction - even if this reduces the capital available for investment in innovation and thus the growth rate in the long term. According to some authors, Denmark is an example of a successful balance between the maximisation of growth and the simultaneous reduction of these externalities. In the 1990s, the Danish government introduced comprehensive unemployment insurance at the same time as deregulating the labour market to stimulate growth. According to empirical studies, the latter completely eliminated the negative effect of unemployment and insolvencies on health and mortality rates in Denmark, which is very pronounced in other countries without such extensive social security systems, such as the USA (see Aghion 2023, p. 218 - 222). **_2. inequality_**. In order to achieve the highest possible aggregate growth, at least in the short term, it would be necessary to accept high levels of inequality in society - or even to expropriate wealth from the poor and redistribute it to the rich. Tyler Cowen illustrates this with a thought experiment (cf. Cowen 2018, p.89): Since the rich generally have more opportunities to invest capital as efficiently as possible in growth-driving companies and can therefore generate higher returns, such a redistribution could massively increase the growth rate. Assuming, for example, that the return on capital of the rich is 8% and that of the poor is 1%, and 20% of the return of the rich would trickle down to the poor due to the positive effects of growth, it would be necessary from a utilitarian perspective and in order to maximise growth to redistribute the assets of the poor to the rich, as the poor would ultimately receive a return of 1.6% and aggregate growth would be higher. Such anti-egalitarian redistribution from rich to poor, even if it would ultimately have a positive effect by increasing the welfare of the poor, should be rejected for several reasons: On the one hand, high inequality has many negative effects, such as declining social mobility and the promotion of destructive resentment, which can also destroy the positive effects of growth and its social and institutional foundations in the long term. In the short term, high inequality can therefore increase the growth rate, but in the long term, equality and growth appear to be complementary to a certain extent, as described in 6.1.  Secondly, as Cowen himself writes, such a redistribution would represent an unacceptable encroachment on human rights, especially property rights (cf. Cown 2018, p.90). **_3. human rights_.** Even if there is often disagreement about their philosophical justification and their concrete scope, according to various surveys, there is a large consensus among the majority of the world's population that human rights are important and that the UN should promote them (see Nickel 2019). According to Robert Nozick, rights, reflecting the Kantian principle of man as an end in himself, act as restrictions on the actions we may use to achieve our goals (cf. Nozick 2013, p.30). Accordingly, we should not seek to maximise growth through methods that violate human rights. In practice, however, the preservation of human rights and long-term economic growth rarely represent an actual contradiction. Even if historically some societies, such as the Soviet Union in the course of Stalinist industrialisation policies, were able to achieve medium-term increases in growth rates with measures that violated human rights (cf. Hunter 1973, p. 242 - 245), the empirical literature repeatedly shows that in the long term, respect for human rights is positively correlated with economic growth (cf. The Danish Institute For Human Rights 2018). Authoritarian regimes that disregard human rights generally only seem to be able to increase the growth rate in the short term, but inhibit growth in the long term. This could also be observed in the Soviet Union: The growth boom of Stalinist industrialisation and the post-war period, was followed by several decades of sustained, relatively low growth, interspersed with phases of stagnation (see Hanson 2016, pp. 242 - 248), which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR.  A similar example is provided by the authoritarian People's Republic of China, which has so far experienced less growth than the democratic Republic of China on Taiwan, whose GDP per capita is twice as high (Maddison Project Database 2020; CEIC 2023). **4. _quality of growth_.** There are qualitative differences in growth that are not captured by GDP. Depending on which inputs are used to drive growth, the type and quantity of the resulting negative externalities change. Growth resulting from an increase in working hours or resource consumption appears less desirable than growth resulting from technological innovation. But there are also qualitative differences in growth through technology: in the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, global growth was strongly fuelled by technologies that were associated with high ecological externalities. This trend has now reversed in developed countries, where growth is increasingly being driven by green, lower-emission innovations (see Ritchie 2021). In many developing countries, however, growth is still being driven by high-emission technologies, partly because these countries are often prevented from directly implementing newer, more sustainable technologies by patents and a lack of local expertise (see Bonnet et al. 2018, p. 17, 36). A transfer of green innovations from wealthier countries could therefore significantly improve the quality of growth in many developing countries. Even in developed countries, there is still plenty of potential to improve the ecological quality of growth, the realisation of which could even increase the growth rate under certain circumstances as a secondary effect. One example of this are political measures that accelerate the creative destruction of unsustainable sectors, such as bans on technologies with high emissions or CO2 prices. The research and development in which companies invest their capital in the search for new, growth-driving innovations is strongly influenced by path dependencies. Companies that already have a competitive advantage in a certain area, such as combustion engines, due to patents and existing production capacities, have stronger incentives to continue investing in this area than in a new one, such as electric engines (see Aghion 2023, p.69). In such cases, the fear of creative destruction among established companies and political institutions often acts as an obstacle to implementing more sustainable technologies - and measures that defy this fear by breaking path dependencies and incentivising more sustainable innovations can improve the quality of growth and also increase the growth rate in the long term (see Aghion 2023, p. 192). However, even if these measures have no or even a negative effect on the growth rate, a qualitative improvement in growth appears to be preferable to quantitative maximisation under certain circumstances. **_5 Existential risks_.** As shown in section 5.4, economic growth contributes to a reduction in existential risks in the long term, although this does not apply to all risks. Certain anthropogenic risks arising from innovation can increase in the short and medium term as a result of growth. For example, innovation and economic growth can lead to the production of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons or biological warfare agents not only becoming possible at all, but also becoming increasingly cheaper over time, so that their proliferation and thus the risk of intentional or unintentional release increases (cf. Ord 2020, p. 122). Other technological innovations, such as in the field of artificial intelligence, could also create existential risks if implemented too quickly, which would be avoidable if implemented more slowly (cf. Ord 2020, p.152). With regard to such risks arising from technology, it may be justified under certain circumstances to temporarily slow down the rate of technological innovation and thus economic growth through selective interventions in the freedom of research in order to give political institutions enough time to develop countermeasures that reduce the risks again (cf. Ord 2020, p.206). **_6. future growth_.** Historically, political efforts that seek to maximise growth at all costs in the short term are often both economically and politically unstable and pave the way back to stagnation in the long term (cf. Cowen 2018, p.30). With regard to the future, and in particular future generations, it seems morally imperative to shape growth in such a way that it is sustainable and does not cannibalise future growth. The advantage of setting the preservation of future growth as a normative goal is that this goal can also integrate many of the other factors discussed in this section. Human rights violations, existential catastrophes, increases in the morality rate through excessive creative destruction and ecological externalities all tend to have the long-term effect of damaging the conditions for growth and thus reducing future growth. **_7. value of the future._** The extent to which we prioritise economic growth depends largely on the value we ascribe to the future, and therefore the _discount rate_ we apply when weighing up current and future costs and gains (cf. Cowen 2018, p.64). This becomes particularly apparent when it comes to weighing up long-term welfare improvements through growth against short-term improvements through distributive measures. For example, if the world were to end tomorrow and the value of the future were to be zero, it would be pointless to invest in growth and instead all the world's wealth could be redistributed in favour of a global farewell party (cf. Cowen 2018, p.84). However, if we attribute the same value to the future as to the present and assume that humanity will continue to exist for a long time, redistribution measures in the present only make sense up to the point at which they do not harm growth, because the future welfare gains from higher growth outweigh the losses of the present (cf. Cowen 2018, p.81, 93 - 94). To summarise, it can be argued that although these factors make growth normatively desirable in principle, in practice the question of the specific type of growth must be asked, as not all types appear to be equally desirable. Aiming for growth without taking into account factors such as the degree of its inclusion and its quality can otherwise lead to its positive effects being cannibalised by negative externalities. However, as historical experience shows, the reduction of such negative externalities is possible with the help of political regulations and often even promotes growth in the long term. ## 6.3 Post-materialistic values and rudiments of a zero-sum world Conventional and traditional moral concepts often emphasise that various post-materialistic values and attitudes should be more important than economic achievements and the accumulation of wealth associated with growth. Depending on the interpretation and position, these post-materialist values encompass a wide range of non-material aspects, from religiosity to secular ones such as altruism, ecological awareness, justice, solidarity, self-realisation and others. Too much material wealth, or the very pursuit of it, is often seen as an obstacle that can distract from the realisation of such values. Corresponding calls and admonitions can be found, for example, in the Old Testament (see e.g. Luther Bible 2017, Eccl 5:11, or Prov 11:28) as well as in the New Testament (see e.g. Luther Bible 2017, Mt 6:19 - 20, or Mk 10:25) and in the Koran (see e.g. Koran 2021, 18:47). These religious ideas, especially in Christianity, often go hand in hand with the idea that material prosperity, if it is to be achieved at all, then only as a secondary reward for morally correct behaviour according to these values (see e.g. Luther Bible 2017, Dt 11:13-15). However, these ideas also appear in the works of supposedly secular philosophers such as Rawls, who writes in _A Theory of Justice, for_ example, that prosperity would be "a meaningless distraction at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness" for the achievement of justice at a certain point (cf. Rawls 2005, p.290), although he does not justify this any further. As alluded to in 5.1, proponents of the _stationary state_ paradigm often assume that such moral concepts could unfold better in a _stationary state_ and would also promote the transition to this _state_ from a certain level of prosperity. From the perspective of these ideas, one objection to the arguments of this paper could be that the positive effects of growth it elaborates depend on the fact that most people currently ascribe a disproportionately high value to their economic status - but it would be normatively more desirable for people to stop doing this and instead adopt more post-materialist values. If they did so, their well-being would be less dependent on their economic status and growth would no longer be so relevant. Several arguments can be put forward against this objection: 1) Firstly, the objection already raised in section 6.1 that certain psychological mechanisms by which people generally attribute a high value to their relative socio-economic status have an evolutionary and neurological basis (see Koski et al. 2015), i.e. are inherent to human nature, so that such a change in value seems implausible. Historical attempts to force such a change in values have so far failed. One example of this is the concept of the New Soviet Man, or the fact that even theocracies such as the Islamic Republic of Iran show the same correlations between economic prosperity and life satisfaction as other states (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser 2017). 2) Even if people were no longer to attribute value to their socio-economic status, this could only cancel out the positive effects of growth on the creation of _non-zero-sumness,_ including institutions and relative satisfaction. However, the positive effects of growth on the objective improvement of life and the reduction of existential risks would remain, as these appear to be largely independent of whether people have materialistic or post-materialistic values. Growth would therefore continue to be normatively relevant, albeit to a lesser extent. 3) The most important argument, which also has the greatest implications for practical philosophy as a whole, is that the intuitions on which these objections are based are simply wrong. Contrary to the idea that economic prosperity is detrimental to the realisation of post-materialist values, growth and prosperity are mostly beneficial to them. If, as in section 5.5, we look at human history and its transformation from exploitative, exclusionary institutions to increasingly altruistic and egalitarian societies made possible by growth, the reality appears to be the other way round, contrary to these intuitions: Growth and prosperity are precisely what enable the realisation of various post-materialist values, such as altruism and egalitarianism. Only when people feel secure in their economic status through constant growth and a high level of prosperity do they prioritise it less and turn to the realisation of post-materialistic values, becoming more tolerant and open towards other people and ideas. At the same time, the objective improvements in their lives made possible by growth offer them more opportunities to do so. However, as soon as economic conditions stagnate or erode, people once again devote themselves increasingly to materialistic values and the defence of their economic status. This can also be seen in empirical studies, according to which the appreciation of post-materialistic values such as freedom, quality of life, sociality and self-realisation increases in times of economic growth in societies, but decreases again in times of stagnation or recession (cf. Inglehart 2018, p.29). The exception is religiosity, which disappears with increasing prosperity - although according to the same studies, people in poorer, religious countries are nevertheless more materialistic in their values overall than people in prosperous, secularised countries (cf. ibid. p.26, 33). If the goal is the greatest possible realisation of post-materialist values and the establishment of just societies, it is not the _stationary state that_ offers the best conditions for this, but rather an inclusive, growing economy. But if this is the case, why do common intuitions - as made explicit in religious texts and the works of many philosophers - suggest that growth and prosperity are detrimental to the achievement of post-materialist values and just societies? Even if the detailed elaboration of these intuitions and their reasons goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the previous explanations at least point to one possible explanation: As elaborated in sections 3.1 and 5.5, humanity has lived in a state of stagnation for most of its history. The agrarian societies in particular, in which the religions that still strongly influence our moral intuitions today, such as Christianity or Islam, emerged, were therefore characterised by _zero-sum thinking_ (cf. Foster 1965, p.67). In such societies, improving one's own economic status was often only possible at the expense of others - and usually not accessible to the masses due to the strong social stratification by institutions such as the nobility. Those who tried to accumulate wealth in such societies often harmed their fellow human beings and attracted resentment, which created incentives to prevent such attempts through moral condemnation. The dogmas of ancient religions, such as early Christianity, which condemn the accumulation of wealth and admonish people to devote themselves more to an afterlife, can therefore be interpreted as strategies to reduce socially harmful behaviour in a _zero-sum game._ This explanation appears to be largely compatible with Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogy of morality, according to which many Christian values arose from a psychological inversion fuelled by resentment, which transformed the hardship of not being able to into a virtue of not wanting to (cf. Nietzsche 2018, p. 281). The misery of not being able to achieve significant economic growth thus gave rise to a moral sentiment that downplays the value of the economy and condemns those who try to make economic progress as a form of self-protection. The problem with this sentiment, however, is that it appears to be both an obstacle to achieving growth and inadequate for operating in a _non-zero-sum economy_. Accordingly, the phase of significant global growth emanating from Europe, in which we still live today, only began at the beginning of the 19th century, after the Enlightenment and reform movements within Christianity had paved the way for increasing criticism and emancipation from such religiously traditional sentiments (cf. Friedman 2011, p.10). Regardless of whether this explanation fully captures the genesis of the prosperity- and growth-sceptic intuitions, it seems plausible to assume that these intuitions arose in some form as adaptations to a _zero-sum world._ Similar to the _exponential growth bias_ discussed in 3.1 or the _status quo bias_ mentioned in 5.3, they presumably represent rudiments from humanity's no-growth past in our thinking, which often make it difficult for us to adequately understand the phenomenon of economic growth, to assess its normative value and consequently to achieve it. This could also explain the great influence of the _stationary state paradigm_ in philosophy, as elaborated in section 3.2. One of the implications of the findings of this thesis is therefore that it might be a relevant research question to ask where else in conventional moral thinking or the mainstream of political philosophy similar ideas and ways of thinking can be found that have presumably emerged as adaptations to a no-growth world, but are potentially obstructive to existence in and the creation of growing economies. # 7.            Conclusion Contrary to the notion, popularised by the _stationary state_ paradigm in political philosophy, that economic growth is neither normatively relevant nor desirable, the arguments presented in this paper suggest that the opposite is the case. Economic growth has a significant influence on a large number of normatively relevant social conditions and goals. Growth goes hand in hand with increasing and maintaining subjective well-being and objective quality of life. It helps to reduce existential risks in the long term. Above all, however, only growth enables a society to be an economic _non-zero-sum game_, which has a positive effect on the establishment and stability of inclusive institutions such as democracies and on the spread of prosocial attitudes. A permanent suppression of growth through this close relationship with inclusive institutions would only be possible through measures that are morally reprehensible. The existence of economic growth in a society is therefore in principle normatively desirable, but this only applies with certain restrictions. For the positive effects of growth to actually unfold, two conditions in particular must be met: On the one hand, growth must be as inclusive as possible, i.e. it must not only be aggregated, but also take place across society as a whole. Furthermore, it must be of such quality that possible negative externalities do not outweigh the positive effects - something that can be ensured through the right regulation and social policy. In practice, however, this is made more difficult by the fact that conventional operationalisations of economic growth, such as GDP per capita, do not reflect its quality and degree of inclusion, so that a more differentiated analysis of these aspects is necessary. Furthermore, _vicious circles_ can occur in which the absence of growth also undermines the creation of growth-promoting conditions and equalising measures. The fact that economic growth is so often underestimated and neglected as a factor in normative considerations in political philosophy can probably be attributed to two main reasons: Firstly, many of the widely held premises about the nature of economic growth are based on outdated theories that can be categorised as false from the perspective of more recent findings in economics and endogenous growth theory. Furthermore, the majority of human history was characterised by the absence of significant economic growth, so that traditional intuitions and anachronistic thought patterns often make it difficult to adequately understand it and classify its normative relevance. To summarise, it can be argued that economic growth should be given greater attention in political philosophy than has been the case to date. Economic growth is not, as is often assumed, harmful or irrelevant to the morality of a society. Above all, as long as growth is inclusive and qualitatively sustainable, it has a number of normatively desirable effects that can hardly or not at all be achieved otherwise, and thus has great normative significance. It thus forms one of the indispensable foundations for the emergence and preservation of democracy and prosociality. # 8.            Bibliography _Aghion, Philippe; Antonin, Céline; Bunel, Simon (2021): The power of creative destruction. Economic upheaval and the wealth of nations. Cambridge, US, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Available online at https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674258686._ _Alvarez, L. W.; Alvarez, W.; Asaro, F.; Michel, H. V. (1980): Extraterrestrial cause for the cretaceous-tertiary extinction. In:_ _Science (New York, N.Y.) 208 (4448), pp. 1095-1108. DOI: 10.1126/science.208.4448.1095._ _Axelrod, Robert M. (2006): The evolution of cooperation. Rev. ed. New York, NY: Basic Books._ _Beckstead, Nick (2014): Will we eventually be able to colonise other stars? Notes from a preliminary review. Future of Humanity Institute. Available online at https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/will-we-eventually-be-able-to-colonize-other-stars-notes-from-a-preliminary-review/, last updated on 20/11/2020, last checked on 06/06/2023._ _Binder, Ariel J.; Bound, John (2019): The Declining Labour Market Prospects of Less-Educated Men. In:_ _The Journal of Economic Perspectives 33 (2), pp. 163-190. DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.2.163._ _Bivens, Josh; Kandra, Jori (2022): CEO pay has skyrocketed 1,460% since 1978: CEOs were paid 399 times as much as a typical worker in 2021. Economic Policy Institute. Available online at https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-in-2021/, last updated on 04.10.2022, last checked on 30.06.2023._ _Bonnet, Clément; Carcanague, Samuel; Hache, Emmanuel; Seck, Gondia Sokhna; Simoën, Marine (2018): The nexus between climate negotiations and low-carbon innovation: a Geopolitics of Renewable Energy Patents, 19.12.2018._ _Available online at https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/GENERATE-Working-Paper-1-December-2018.pdf, last checked on 01.07.2023._ _Bostrom, Nick (2003): Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. In:_ _Utilitas 15 (3), pp. 308-314. DOI: 10.1017/S0953820800004076._ _Bostrom, Nick (2017): Superintelligence. Paths, dangers, strategies. Reprinted with corrections. Oxford: Oxford University Press._ _CDC (2023): CDC Museum COVID-19 Timeline. Available online at https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html, last updated on 18.06.2023, last checked on 18.06.2023._ _CEIC (2023): Taiwan GDP per Capita._ _In:_ _CEICdata.com, 08.07.2023. Available online at https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/taiwan/gdp-per-capita, last checked on 08.07.2023._ _Chaves, C.; Castellanos, T.; Abrams, M.; Vazquez, Carmelo (2018): The impact of economic recessions on depression and individual and social well-being: the case of Spain (2006-2013). In: Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 53 (9), pp. 977-986. DOI: 10.1007/s00127-018-1558-2._ _Cowen, Tyler (2018): Stubborn attachments. A vision for a society of free, prosperous, and responsible individuals. First edition. San Francisco, CA: Stripe Press._ _Daly, Herman E. (2012): Steady-State Economics. Second Edition With New Essays. Chicago: Island Press._ _Encyclopedia Britannica (2023): Slavery | Definition, History, & Facts. Available online at https://www.britannica.com/topic/slavery-sociology, last updated on 19/06/2023, last checked on 28/06/2023._ _Foa, R.S.; Klassen, A.; Slade, M.; Rand, A.; Collins, R. (2020): The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020." Cambridge, United Kingdom: Centre for the Future of Democracy._ _Foster, George M. (1965): Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good. In:_ _American Anthropologist 67 (2), pp. 293-315. DOI: 10.1525/aa.1965.67.2.02a00010._ _Friedman, Benjamin M. (2006): The moral consequences of economic growth. 1st Vintage books ed. New York, NY: Vintage Books._ _Friedman, Benjamin M. (2021): Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York: Vintage Books._ _Ghosh, Jayati (2011): Fear of Foreigners: Recession and Racism in Europe. In: Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 4 (2), pp. 183-190. DOI: 10.2979/racethmulglocon.4.2.183._ _Giattino, Charlie; Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban; Roser, Max (2020): Working Hours._ _In:_ _Our World in Data. Available online at https://ourworldindata.org/working-hours#are-we-working-more-than-ever, last checked on 17/06/2023._ _Hanson, Philip (2016): Rise and fall of the soviet economy. An economic history of the USSR 1945-1991. New York: Routledge._ _Hanson, Robin (1998): The great filter-are we almost past it. Available online at https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/greatfilter.html., last checked on 01.07.2023_ _Hasell, Joe; Max Roser; Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban; Arriagada, Pablo (2022): Poverty. In: Our World in Data. Available online at https://ourworldindata.org/poverty, last checked on 10/06/2023._ _Hunter, Holland (1973): The Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan. In:_ _Slavic Review 32 (2), pp. 237-257. DOI: 10.2307/2495959._ _Inglehart, Ronald (2018): Cultural evolution. People's motivations are changing, and reshaping the world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press._ _Jones, Bradley (2018): An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters. Pew Research Center. Available online at https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/, last updated on 26.10.2022, last checked on 30.06.2023._ _Kahneman, Daniel (2012): Think fast, think slow. Munich: Penguin Verlag._ Kardashev, N.S. (1964). Transmission of information by extraterrestrial civilisations. In: Soviet Astronomy AJ. Available online at: _http://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu/pdf/1964SvA.....8..217K, last checked on 16.06.2023_ _Keynes, John Maynard (2010): Essays in persuasion. New ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan._ _Koran (2021): Qurʾan. The Holy Qurʾan : Arabic with German translation. Ed. Aḥmad, Mīrzā Masrūr. Published by Der Islam; Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat in Germany. Completely revised and improved edition. Frankfurt am Main._ _Koski, Jessica E.; Xie, Hongling; Olson, Ingrid R. (2015): Understanding social hierarchies: The neural and psychological foundations of status perception. In:_ _Social neuroscience 10 (5), pp. 527-550. DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2015.1013223_ _Kogelmann, Brian (2022): We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth. In:_ _Utilitas 34 (4), pp. 478-492. DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000358._ _Komlos, John, The Economic Roots of the Rise of Trumpism (2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6868, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144271_ _Land, Nick (2013): Critique of transcendental miserabilism. In: Avanessian, Armen (2013): #Acceleration. Berlin: Merve Verlag_ _Lubin, Philip; Cohen, Alexander N. (2022): Don't Forget To Look Up._ _Available online at http://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.10663v4., last checked on 12/07/2023_ _Luther Bible (2017). Available online at https://www.die-bibel.de/bibeln/ last updated on 16.06.2023, last checked on 16.06.2023._ _Maddison Project Database 2020_ _. Available online at https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2020?lang=en, last checked on 20 May 2023._ _Malthus, Thomas (1998): An Essay on the Principle of Population. Electronic Scholarly Publishing. Available online at: http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf, last checked on 08.06.2023_ _Mankiw, N. Gregory (2021): Fundamentals of Economics. In collaboration with Mark P. Taylor. 8th edition 2021. Freiburg: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag für Wirtschaft Steuern Recht GmbH._ _Mann, Charles C. (2018): The Book That Incited a Worldwide Fear of Overpopulation._ _In:_ _Smithsonian Magazine, 02.01.2018. Available online at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/book-incited-worldwide-fear-overpopulation-180967499/, last checked on 10.07.2023._ _Marx, Karl; Engels, Friedrich; Hubmann, Gerald; Kopf, Eike; Roth, Regina; Schefold, Bertram; Vollgraf, Carl-Erich (eds.) (2004): Das Kapital. Critique of Political Economy. Third volume, Hamburg 1894. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Akademie Forschung (Complete Edition (MEGA) /Karl Marx Friedrich Engels._ _Edited by the International Marx-Engels Foundation, Volume 15)._ _Mcafee, Andrew (2020): More From Less: The surprising story of how we learnt to prosper using fewer resources - and what happens next._ _London, UK: Simon & Schuster._ _Meinert, Ruth (2013). The development of working hours in German industry 1820 - 1956. GESIS Datenarchiv, Cologne. ZA8494 Data file version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11709_ _Melott, A. L.; Lieberman, B. S.; Laird, C. M.; Martin, L. D.; Medvedev, M. V.; Thomas, B. C. et al._ _(2004): Did a gamma-ray burst initiate the late Ordovician mass extinction? In: International Journal of Astrobiology 3 (1), pp. 55-61. DOI: 10.1017/S1473550404001910_ _Mill, John Stuart (2009): Principles of Political Economy. Abridged with Critical, Bibliographical, and Explanatory Notes, and a Sketch of the History of Political Economy. Edited by J. Laurence Laughlin. Available online at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/30107, last updated on 10.04.2022, last checked on 09.06.2023._ _Moller, Dan (2011): Wealth, Disability, and Happiness. In:_ _Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (2), pp. 177-206. DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01205.x._ _Nickel, James (2019): Human Rights. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy._ _Available online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/, last checked on 30/06/2023._ _Nietzsche, Friedrich (2018): Beyond good and evil. On the genealogy of morality. New edition 1999, 15th edition 2018. ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Munich, Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag; de Gruyter (dtv, 30155)_ _Nozick, Robert; Nagel, Thomas (2013): Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books._ _Muzhani, Marin (2014): Mainstream Growth Economists and Capital Theorists. A Survey. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press._ _Nussbaum, Martha Craven (2013): Creating capabilities. The human development approach. First Harvard University Press paperback edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press._ _Ord, Toby (2021): The precipice. Existential risk and the future of humanity. New York: Hachette Books._ _Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban; Roser, Max (2017): Happiness and Life Satisfaction._ _In:_ _Our World in Data. Available online at https://ourworldindata.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction/#the-link-between-happiness-and-income, last checked on 23/06/2023._ _Plato (2017): The State. Reclam's Universal Library. 1st edition. Edited by Gernot Krapinger. Ditzingen: Reclam Verlag (Reclam's Universal Library)._ _Rapp, Christof; Corcilius, Klaus (eds.) (2021): Aristotle Handbook. Life - work - impact. 2nd, updated and expanded edition 2021. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, Part of Springer Nature - Springer-Verlag GmbH; J.B. Metzler._ _Rawls, John (2000): The law of peoples. With "The idea of public reason revisited". 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press._ _Rawls, John (2005): A theory of justice. Reprint. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press._ _Reeves, Richard; Pulliam, Christopher; Schobert, Ashley (2019): Are wages rising, falling, or stagnating?_ _In:_ _Brookings Institution, 10.09.2019. Available online at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/are-wages-rising-falling-or-stagnating/, last checked on 30.06.2023._ _Ritchie, Hannah (2021): Many countries have decoupled economic growth from CO₂ emissions, even if we take offshored production into account._ _Edited by Our World in Data. Available online at https://ourworldindata.org/co2-gdp-decoupling, last updated on 01.12.2021 , last checked on 30.05.2023._ _Roser, Max; Ritchie, Hannah; Rosado, Pablo (2022): Crop Yields. In:_ _Our World in Data. Available online at https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields,_ _last updated on 01.12.2021,_ _last checked on 06.06.2023._ _Rose, Julie L. (2020): On the value of economic growth. In: Politics, Philosophy & Economics 19 (2), pp. 128-153. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19889123._ _Różycka-Tran, Joanna; Boski, Paweł; Wojciszke, Bogdan (2015): Belief in a Zero-Sum Game as a Social Axiom._ _In:_ _Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 46 (4), pp. 525-548. DOI: 10.1177/0022022115572226._ _Federal Statistical Office (2022): Weekly working hours. Available online at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarkt/Qualitaet-Arbeit/Dimension-3/woechentliche-arbeitszeitl.html, last updated on 16.12.2022, last checked on 19.05.2023._ _Schasfoort, Joeri (2023): How China Beat the German Car Industry in Just 5 Years. Available online at https://www.moneymacro.rocks/2023-05-14-german-car-china/, last updated on 14/05/2023, last checked on 18/05/2023._ _Schonger, Martin; Sele, Daniela (2021): Intuition and exponential growth: bias and the roles of parameterisation and complexity. In:_ _Math Semesterber 68 (2), pp. 221-235. DOI: 10.1007/s00591-021-00306-7._ _Schwitzgebel, Eric (2020): The Splintered Mind: The 233 Most-Cited Works in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-233-most-cited-works-in-stanford.html, last updated on 23/07/2020, last checked on 26/05/2023._ _Siegel, Ethan (2022): How many planets are there in the Universe? In: Big Think, 17.01.2022. Available online at https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/planets-universe/, last checked on 06.06.2023._ _Skrobisz, Nikodem (2022): Climate crisis, degrowth and the limits to growth: Why we need more growth, not less._ _ Smith, Adam. _An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations_. Edited by Sálvio M. Soares. MetaLibri, 2007, v.1.0p._ _Stevenson, Betsey; Wolfers, Justin (2008): Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox. In:_ _Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008, pp. 1-87. Available online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/27561613._ _The Danish Institute For Human Rights (2018): Human rights contribute positively to economic growth, 04.12.2018._ _Available online at https://www.humanrights.dk/news/human-rights-contribute-positively-economic-growth, last checked on 01.07.2023._ _Ulrich, Peter (2008): In Search of the Whole of Economic Reason: The St. Gallen Approach to Integrative Business Ethics. In: Wolfgang Kersting (ed.): Moral und Kapital. Fundamental questions of economic and business ethics._ _Boston: BRILL, pp. 61-75._ _Watson, Oliver J.; Barnsley, Gregory; Toor, Jaspreet; Hogan, Alexandra B.; Winskill, Peter; Ghani, Azra C. (2022): Global impact of the first year of COVID-19 vaccination: a mathematical modelling study. In:_ _The Lancet. Infectious diseases 22 (9), pp. 1293-1302. DOI: 10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00320-6._ _WHO (2022): Global spending on health: rising to the pandemic's challenges._ _In:_ _World Health Organization, 12.08.2022. Available online at https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240064911, last checked on 18.06.2023._ _World Bank Open Data (2023): World Bank Open Data._ _Available online at https://data.worldbank.org/, last updated on 08.06.2023, last checked on 08.06.2023._ _Wright, Robert (2001): NonZero. The logic of human destiny. 1st Vintage books ed. New York: Vintage Books._ --- [[1]](#_ftnref1) A similar explanation can already be found in my seminar paper "Climate crisis, degrowth and the limits to growth: Why we need more growth, not less" (2022)